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U.S. shipyards are an integral component of the
nation's defense infrastructure. Shipyards provide
shipbuilding capability and repair support for the U.S. Navy
and the U.S. -flag fleet. During the 1980s, however, U.S. Navy
shipbuilding, repair, and modernization programs achieved
dominance over commercial vessel shipyard work. Commercial
business at U.S. shipyards declined to a point where by 1991
Navy work accounted for ninety percent of the direct labor
hours at the biggest five shipyards within the United States.
With the end of the Cold War and the downsizing of the armed
forces, U.S. shipyards now face years of declining Navy
budgets. This thesis addresses the shipbuilding industry, the
factors contributing to the decline in commercial shipbuilding
orders, the growth of Navy shipbuilding work, and proposes
avenues whereby U.S. shipyards can regain a competitive
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The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact
of the declining Navy shipbuilding budget on the public and
the private shipyards within the United States. Specific
areas to be addressed include: labor force levels, supplier
base impact, national defense concerns, and foreign
competition. In addition, this thesis will focus on
alternative measures which can be taken to facilitate the
transition from the recent emphasis on Navy shipbuilding to an
emphasis on commercial shipbuilding with a primary goal being
the development of U.S. shipyards into world class competitors
for new ship builds and repair.
B. SCOPE
With the exception of World War I and World War II, the
United States has not been a dominant force in the
international shipbuilding industry during the last 150 years.
The era of the Clipper ship (1830 - 1890) is the one exception
in time where U.S. commercial shipbuilders were a dominant
player in the international merchant shipbuilding market.
Since the two world wars, however, American shipyards, at
best, were only able to attract and keep a level of business
that equalled single digit percentages of the world
shipbuilding market. Since the conclusion of World War II,
the United States shipbuilding industry has steadily been
losing this single digit world share to foreign shipyards. As
American shipyards have been unable to maintain a profitable
level of new build and repair business, the number of U.S.
shipyards has been declining.
The 1980s witnessed a dramatic decline in world
shipbuilding demand. Despite this industry-wide depression,
U.S. shipyards were protected from global economic forces by
the Reagan defense buildup. However, now the 1980 's goal of
a 600 ship Navy has been adjusted down to a force of about 400
active ships. The amount of shipbuilding and repair work
available to U.S. shipyards under this downsized Navy will not
be enough to support the existing U.S. shipyard base. A
further decline in shipyard capacity and capability raises
issues concerning the ability of the United States to maintain
its industrial base as well as its ability to mobilize its
industrial base for war.
This thesis will cover some of the factors that have led
to the current situation by examining the shipbuilding
industry, the present economic and political environment
facing the shipyards, and some of the recommendations from
various interest groups who claim that their recommendations
will enable the shipyards to become world-class competitors
capable of attracting the level of new builds and repairs
required to stay in business without an over reliance on naval
construction or naval repair.
C . METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in the development of this thesis
includes the study of published and unpublished information
from various sources including general literature, government
commissions, government agencies, and past Naval Postgraduate
School theses. Relevant information from these sources was
compiled in an effort to obtain a complete understanding of
the subject from which a comprehensive analysis could be done.
Whenever possible the most current information available was
incorporated into this thesis.
D. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I
provides an introduction and background data for the thesis.
Chapter II provides an overview of the shipbuilding industry.
Chapter III analyzes the causes for the decline in U.S.
shipyards. Chapter IV summarizes current proposals to reverse
the decline, and Chapter V presents conclusions and
recommendations based on the facts presented throughout the
thesis.
E . BACKGROUND
The United States shipbuilding industry has not been
competitive with foreign shipyards since the end of the Second
World War. As a result of this inability to compete on the
world shipbuilding market, commercial shipbuilding in the
United States has virtually ground to a halt. If it were not
for the defense buildup years under President Reagan, U.S.
shipyards would have faced the full brunt of the world-wide
shipbuilding depression of the 1980s.
During the 1980s a significant amount of work was
contracted for by the U.S. Navy. In fact, so much Navy work
was ordered that the vast majority of new builds in U.S. yards
were for naval vessels. Navy funding dominated the industry
to the point where approximately 97 percent of all direct ship
labor hours could be attributable to Navy contracts [Ref. 1:
p. 3]. This boom in naval construction, however, is rapidly
coming to a close due to the end of the "Cold War" between the
United States and the former Soviet Union and due to the
mounting budgetary problems of the U.S. government. The
Navy's fiscal year (FY) 1992 through 1997 shipbuilding and
repair programs reflect significantly lower levels of work
than those of previous years. During the 1980s, the Navy's
construction programs averaged nineteen new ships per year,
whereas the current FY 92 through 97 budget reguest reflects
new construction at a rate of less than ten ships per year or
approximately 50 percent of the average workload experienced
during the 1980s [Ref l:p. 2].
Adding to U.S. shipyard woes are the declining number of
repair and modernization availabilities. The number of repair
availabilities is shrinking for two reasons. First,
significant gains in maintainability and reliability have been
achieved since the advent of the Navy's Reliability
Improvement Program. This program is designed to reduce the
life cycle cost of Navy systems by improving mean time between
failures and reducing preventive and corrective maintenance
time. Second, as the Navy decommissions more and more ships,
the demand for repair and modernization availabilities will
decline. Due to these fundamental changes in the industry's
environment, dramatic repercussions are expected in both the
U.S. shipbuilding industry and in the shipbuilding support
industry.
The Navy contracts of the 198 0s supported about ninety
percent of the labor force at the five primary, private
shipyards performing Navy work. The big five shipyards
benefiting most from the Navy build-up included: Avondale,
Bath Iron Works, General Dynamics/Electric Boat Division,
Ingalls, and Newport News Shipbuilding [Ref. l:p. 2].
The magnitude of the proposed decline in Navy construction
and repair programs, combined with the lack of commercial
shipbuilding contracts, are a cause for alarm. Current
commercial and military construction and repair contracts will
not support the shipbuilding capacity present in the U.S.
today. Based on the projected reduction in Navy business,
twenty-five to thirty-five merchant ship builds per year will
be required in order to maintain the current industrial base
level [Ref. 2:p. 3].
Consequently, unless demand for American-built ships
increases, shipyard capacity will continue to shrink. This
anticipated loss of further shipbuilding capacity raises
serious national issues in the areas of: mobilization
requirements to meet national defense needs; the impact on the
shipyard supplier base; the impact on the remaining shipyards
in terms of labor pools, facilities, and the capability to
continue to develop naval technological improvements; and the
risks of relying on foreign shipbuilding capability to meet
the needs of the American economy.
II. SHIPBUILDING OVERVIEW
Chapter II will provide an overview of the shipbuilding
industry. First, historical background material on
shipbuilding in the United States will be presented. Second,
an overview of the world's shipbuilding industry will be
described. The chapter will conclude with the recent declines
being experienced by U.S. yards.
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The shipbuilding industry in North America dates back to
the colonial days. Small warships were built by the English
and the Dutch using temporary government dockyards and
shipwrights brought into the colonies for specific ship
builds. At the end of construction, the shipwrights were
usually sent home. This policy helped prevent the development
of a large shipbuilding industry or a naval construction
program in the colonies [Ref. 3:p. 5].
American naval shipbuilding is said to have started with
the construction of the FALKLAND, a British naval man-of-war,
in Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1690. This warship was
contract-built by a private shipyard. Also, for the first
time, colonial rather than foreign shipwrights were used
[Ref. 3:p. 5].
Although the colonies obtained further shipbuilding
experience in the years that followed, they were ill prepared
for the Revolutionary War with England, at that point in time
the strongest naval power in the world. In 1775, the
Continental Congress purchased two merchant ships of about 4 50
tons and outfitted them with 24-guns each. The government
later obtained six brigs or brigantines, three schooners and
five sloops to defend America's coasts from the British. By
December of that year, thirteen more frigates were ordered
constructed by the Continental Congress followed by an
additional ship order in November 1776 for three 74-gun ships,
five 3 6-gun frigates, an 18-gun brig, and a packet.
Additional ships were purchased, borrowed, or captured
throughout the war until its conclusion [Ref. 3:pp. 53-79].
These early ships were made primary from oak wood. Oak,
however, was later replaced by teak towards the end of the
eighteenth century. Although wood reguirements varied from
ship type to ship type, a typical vessel of this period took
around 2,000 trees to build [Ref. 4:p. 117]. By 1780, the
first all-American ship in design and construction was
commissioned. This warship, RATTLESNAKE, was a 4 2 0-ton
corvette [Ref. 4:p. 202].
The period from the mid-eighteenth century to the early
nineteenth century (1740 - 1840) is known as the Golden Age of
Naval Exploration. During this time, naval vessels were being
built to circumnavigate the world and to perform an increasing
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array of scientific expeditions. This was the period of Parry
and Darwin [Ref. 4:pp. 208 - 219]. European powers dominated
in the area of naval exploration. Americans, on the other
hand, turned their attention inward with the exploration of
the North American continent.
In the nineteenth century, sailing vessels took on a new
importance. Merchants began to see expanding opportunities
with the growth in trade brought about by the Industrial
Revolution [Ref. 5: p. 167]. China provided a source of demand
for opium and a source of supply for tea [Ref. 4: p. 242].
Britain's factories were in need of American cotton to support
England's manufacture and export of broadcloth, woolens,
muslin, and calicoes [Ref. 6:p. 156]. This period also saw
the rapid rise in demand for passenger travel with the
discovery of gold in California and Australia in 1848 and
1851, respectively [Ref. 6:pp. 193 - 217]. In addition,
immigration to the U.S. was exploding. Over 4,028,589
emigrants, most of them heading to the U.S., left Ireland
between 1851 and 1905 [Ref. 5:p. 173]. The nineteenth century
was an era of economic growth.
U.S. shipbuilders responded to this economic boom with the
American Clipper. Clippers, so named because they could
"clip" the time off a packet ship's regularly scheduled run,
had the War of 1812 to thank for their origin. During the
war, Congress had authorized a number of privateers who found
that speed, rather than cargo space, was a feature necessary
for successful raiding against British merchants [Ref. 5:
p. 199].
American shipbuilders excelled in Clipper design,
particularly during the period 1845 - 1860. This was the
"heyday" of the American Tea Clipper which was built for the
tea trade between China and England. Contributing to the
demand for more bottoms was Britain's repeal of the Navigation
Act in 1849. The Navigation Act had mandated the use of
Commonwealth bottoms for all British imports [Ref. 5:p. 199].
The discovery of gold in California brought new business
opportunities for Clipper shipbuilders and shipowners.
Immigrants seeking their fortune in California could (1) head
west by wagon train, (2) steam to the Isthmus of Panama, cross
the Isthmus by land, and then steam up to California, or (3)
take the 16,000 mile trip around the Horn of South America on
a Clipper. The most popular of the three choices was the
Clipper ship [Ref. 7:p. 271], Ships taking immigrants and
supplies from New York to California, goods to China, and
returning with tea to England could practically pay for
themselves with one voyage [Ref. 6:p. 193]. Gold rush prices
for supplies were extremely lucrative for shippers, even by
today's standards (i.e., a dollar apiece for eggs and $40 a
quart for whiskey) [Ref. 7:p. 271].
American builders were very successful during this period
for several reasons. First, the U.S. was rich in untapped
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natural resources, particularly forests. Second, relatively
cheap labor was also available due to the growing number of
immigrants. Third, demand for new ships was high due to the
enormous profit opportunities brought about by the growing
world economy.
Clippers were relatively cheap to build, but they also had
short life spans. Shipyards usually used the wood from
nearby forests which minimized transportation costs. The soft
wood, however, lasted only about five years. A second factor
contributing to the Clippers' short life span was the practice
of ship captains to push their ships to the limit in an effort
to have the shortest transit times [Ref. 5:p. 199].
Donald McKay, a renown builder of the time, launched 137
sailing vessels totalling some 137,280 tons during the Golden
Age of the Clippers. McKay's GREAT REPUBLIC, launched in
1853, was built in response to the California gold rush and
required "134,531 cubic feet of pine, 2,056 tons of white oak,
336 tons of iron, and 5.6 tons of copper" [Ref. 4:p. 249].
Due to advancing technology and the capabilities afforded
by the Industrial Revolution, larger and larger Clipper ships
were built. The Tea and Colonial Clippers of 1857 - 1875 were
the first to use a combination of metal and wood [Ref. 4:
pp. 244 - 247]. Composite ships, as these were called, had
hull planking, decks, and a keel made of wood which were
attached to keelson, frames, and deck beams made of iron.
This combination resulted in a considerable weight savings as
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well as greater cargo capacity [Ref. 5:p. 153]. Two famous
composite ships were the THERMOPYLAE and the CUTTY SARK
[Ref. 4:p. 244].
During the American Civil War (1861 - 1865), U.S.
shipbuilders went into decline. They lost their Clipper
design superiority to the British and were never able to
regain their prominence [Ref. 5:pp. 200 - 201].
In any event, time was running out for the Clippers.
Although technology was expanding their capabilities,
technology was also accelerating their demise. According to
Carl C. Cutler, a Clipper historian, Clippers climaxed in 1853
with 120 launches that year. By 1855 there were only 42
launches. Cutler believes that the last three "true" Clippers
were built in 1859 [Ref. 7:p. 255]. A snapshot look at
merchant ship tonnage during the nineteenth century can be
seen in Table 1 below. The figures provide some indication of
the vessel tonnage supported by shipyards of the time.
The technology of the nineteenth century produced the
first steam and iron vessels. Metallurgy began its ascent in
the U.S. from 1840. The dominance of steel soon followed in
1870 [Ref. 8:p. 4]. Fulton's historic steam trip up the
Hudson in 1807 marked the birth of a new age — commercially
viable steam transportation 1 . Eight years later, Fulton
1 Fulton had to buy his steam engine from England due to the
lack of American engineers with sufficient experience [Ref. 5:
p. 148],
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designed the first steam warship, DEMOLOGOS , which was
launched too late for the War of 1812. By 1838, SIRIUS and
GREAT WESTERN made the first steam-powered transits across the
Atlantic. France and Britain launched the first iron-clad
warships, GLOIRE and WARRIOR, in 18 59 and 1861, respectively.
Advancements in naval technology eventually led to the
development of the Dreadnaught class of battleships in 1906
[Ref . 6:pp. 142 - 303]
.
TABLE 1. MERCHANT SHIP FLEETS OF 1875.
COUNTRY NUMBER OF SHIPS TOTAL TONNAGE
England 19,709 5,543,567














Steam ships ultimately displaced sail for economic
reasons. Smaller crew sizes were reguired on steam ships.
13
Furthermore, the completion of the Suez and Panama Canals, in
1869 and 1914, respectively, also contributed to the demise of
the Clipper fleets. These shortcuts eliminated the need for
long trips around the capes of Africa and South America, and
consequently, they eliminated the speed advantages associated
with Clippers [Ref. 4:pp. 263 - 266]. The shift from sail to
steam also produced a shift in shipbuilding dominance. Steam
shipbuilding necessitated an industrial base. England, as the
birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, was to reap the
advantages of her newfound industrial capabilities.
Britain's ocean tonnage grew twelvefold between 1850 and
1910 [Ref. 9:p. 279]. At the outbreak of the First World War,
Great Britain was to possess the largest maritime fleet with
merchant shipping totalling 11.5 million tons. Not
surprisingly, the Royal Navy, too, was the largest in the
world with 65 battleships, 120 cruisers and a host of
destroyers and smaller craft [Ref. 10:p. 89]. Britain also
possessed the shipyard capability to support her large
maritime interests at the start of the war.
U.S. shipyards, on the other hand, were not ready for the
First World War. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in
1914, there was virtually no wartime preparation in U.S.
shipyards. Some U.S. businesses found themselves in extremis
when foreign vessels were removed from U.S. commerce in the
early stages of the war. Up to that time, British, French,
German, and Italian vessels carried the bulk of America's
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international trade. U.S. flag vessels had been concentrating
primarily on coastal trade and only shipped approximately ten
percent of the U.S. international trade [Ref. ll:p. 48].
The Shipping Act of 1916 established the Emergency Fleet
Corporation (EFC) which was chartered to alleviate the impact
caused by the loss of foreign bottoms. The EFC fulfilled its
charter to "purchase, construct, and operate government
vessels." The domestic shipyard expansion program initiated
by the EFC eventually produced a national monthly capacity of
400,000 gross tons and a fleet of over 2,300 ships [Ref. 11:
p. 48]. Unfortunately, all of the ships were delivered after
the Armistice of 1918 had been signed. This glut of ships
depressed the shipbuilding market during the 1920s as the
post-war depression was setting in.
America's preparations for World War Two were considerably
superior to those of the First World War. Nevertheless,
weaknesses were still observable. Pre-war preparations
enabled U.S. shipyards to produce in 1943 the same number of
ships that were produced in the preceding twenty-five years
using a work force that was seventeen times the previous
twenty-five year average [Ref. ll:p. 49]. A summary of
significant pre-war preparations follows:
• Roosevelt's National Industrial Recovery Act of 16 June
1933 initiated the Navy's buildup by authorizing numerous
light cruisers, destroyers, carriers ENTERPRISE and
YORKTOWN, and four submarines [Ref. ll:p. 50].
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• The Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 facilitated further
wartime preparation by authorizing the building of 141
vessels of various types [Ref. ll:p. 50].
• The Merchant Marine Act was passed in 193 6, thereby laying
the groundwork for a modern U.S. merchant marine [Ref. 12:
p. 117].
• Twenty Percent Expansion Act of 1938, the Eleven Percent
Expansion Act of June 1940, and the Seventy Percent
Expansion Act of July 1940 were all designed to prepare
the Navy and the nation for war [Ref. 11 :p. 50].
Sixty-eight shipyards were building naval vessels by
February 1941 [Ref. ll:p. 51], Adding to America's wartime
preparations were: (1) orders from Britain for 60 dry cargo
ships in 1940 followed shortly thereafter by a U.S. Government
order for 200 more, and (2) President Roosevelt's declaration
of an Unlimited National Emergency in 1941 which resulted in
the acceleration of America's shipbuilding program [Ref. ll:p.
50]. Despite all of this preparation, the U.S. was still not
ready for the shipping losses which were to be realized from
late 1941 through 1942.
From 1939 to 1945 approximately 5,777 merchant vessels
were built in the United States [Ref. ll:p. 53].
Concurrently, U.S. naval forces were constructed at a rate
never to be equalled before or since. Between July 1940 and
June 1945, American shipbuilders armed the "arsenal of
democracy" with the following naval vessels: ten battleships,
18 large aircraft carriers, nine small aircraft carriers, 110
escort carriers, two large cruisers, ten heavy cruisers, 3 3
16
light cruisers, 358 destroyers, 504 destroyer escorts, 211
submarines, and 82,028 landing craft of various designs
[Ref. ll:p. 53].
At the conclusion of the war, the shipbuilding capacity of
the United States far exceeded the peacetime demand. As a
result, many shipyards were closed as a part of America's
demobilization effort. In addition, the U.S. Government sold
off the vast majority of its inventory of merchant ships
pursuant to the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 194 6. Those ships
which remained in the government's inventory after domestic
and foreign demand had been satisfied (excess supply) were
incorporated into the National Defense Reserve Fleet
[Ref. 13:p. 20].
The flood of ships into the post-war market did little to
promote world-wide shipbuilding. Compared to the annual
production levels experienced during the Second World War,
ship construction in the U.S. between 1949 and 1958 was
unspectacular. Of the 2 06 ships built during this timeframe,
35 merchant ships were constructed under a Federal
shipbuilding program in response to the Korean War [Ref. 14:
p. 41]. Without this Federal shipbuilding program, the U.S.
shipbuilding history covering this period would have been even
less noteworthy. Appendix A illustrates U.S. production
levels during this time frame.
The decline of U.S. shipyards continued into the 1960s.
The gradual military buildup during the Vietnam War did not
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create a big demand on U.S. shipyards. Sealift requirements
were largely filled by the 150 National Defense Reserve Fleet
vessels that were activated in support of the war effort
Million Gross Tons
30 36 40 46 60 66 60 66 70 76 80
5-YEAR MIDPOINT
(1900)
Figure 1. Merchant Ship Construction in U.S. Yards Five
Year Average (1930 - 1980). [Ref. 12:p. 91]
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[Ref. 14:p. 41]. Figure 1 shows the five-year average
merchant ship construction in the United States from 19 3
through 1980.
While post-Second World War shipbuilding has remained
relatively steady in the U.S., in terms of gross tons, world
seaborne trade has experienced significant growth as
illustrated in Figure 2. Thus, U.S. shipyards have steadily
lost commercial shipbuilding market share in absolute terms.
U.S. shipbuilders averaged less than five percent of the
world's demand for commercial ship orders from 1972 through
1982 [Ref. 12:p. 89]. In 1988 and 1989, U.S. shipyards had
zero percent of the world's commercial shipbuilding market
[Ref. 15:p. 21]. This drop in commercial shipbuilding
contracts can also be seen in the Active Shipbuilding
Industrial Base (ASIB) . In March 1983, the ASIB consisted of
26 shipyards [Ref. 12:p. 88]. This figure dropped to 16 in
1990, a 38 percent decline in just seven years [Ref. 16:
p. 48].
In the 1990s, the health of the American shipbuilding
industry is still tied to the forces of global politics and
global economics. Unfortunately, from the U.S. shipbuilding
industry's standpoint, global economics and global politics
have been weakening the U.S. industry rather than providing
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Figure 2. Development of World International Seaborne
Trade (1965 - 1988). [Ref. 17:p. 147]
The decline of U.S. shipyards is attributable to many
factors including overcapacity within the industry, the cyclic
nature of the industry, the impact of both foreign and
domestic subsidies, the productivity of American shipyards
relative to their competition world-wide, and the economic
realities of labor rules, wages, and unions.
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The American shipbuilding industry has declined to a point
where national concern is warranted. The United States is the
world's largest trading nation and its economy relies heavily
on the movement of goods and services into and out of the
country [Ref. 12:p. 3]. In addition to providing the economic
grease for a capitalistic society, trade is also a necessity
when it comes to strategic materials that are not available
within the United States in the quantities required for
national defense purposes. By far, the vast majority of
American imports and exports are transported by ships. This
reliance on the sea, then, makes it prudent that America
maintain a capability to build and repair ships in quantities
required to meet national defense needs. Despite this need,
current trends are pointing to a death knell for still more
American shipyards.
B. OVERVIEW OF THE SHIPBUILDING PROCESS
Shipbuilding is a unique industry in many respects. The
demand for shipbuilding, complexity of the manufacturing
process, capital and labor requirements, and national defense
issues all combine to give shipbuilding its individualistic
character in the industrialized world. These features that
give the shipbuilding industry uniqueness also contribute to
the wildly cyclic business patterns that are a hallmark of the
industry. Since 1896, the world shipbuilding industry has
experienced over nine major cycles, three of which have
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occurred since World War II. During these cycles, demand for
new ships dropped by over forty percent [Ref. 12: p. 87]. To
more fully understand how these factors impact on the cyclic
nature of shipbuilding, each is addressed more fully in the
sections that follow.
1. DEMAND FOR SHIPBUILDING
Like all transportation needs, demand for new ships is
derived demand [Ref. 18:p. 518]. Shipowners do not contract
to have ships built unless the demand for carrier services is
sufficient to justify the costs and the risks associated with
the construction and the operation of a new ship. In essence,
the root of shipbuilding demand is world trade. As
international trade increases, shippers will demand more
capacity on the part of carriers. Up to a point, carriers can
increase their capacity by increasing operating speed,
reducing turnaround time in port, and by bringing older, less
efficient ships out of lay-up [Ref. 19:pp. 81 - 91].
As demand for bottoms continues to increase, carriers
are able to justify higher freight rates in order to
rationalize their capacity. Beyond a given point, however,
economics dictates that the shipowner must contract for a new
vessel. With a newer ship, the shipowner is able to increase
his capacity while possibly reducing operating costs due to
the ship's modern technological design (i.e., fuel-efficient
engines and automation to reduce manning requirements) . Until
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such time as shipowners are convinced that a requirement for
new capacity exists, shipyards must confine their activities
to either repair or special order contracts (i.e., custom
work) . This cyclic business pattern creates a challenge for
shipyard management. Not only must management be prepared to
take advantage of surging demand for new ships, but when
business is in decline, management must also be able to
husband labor and capital resources without jeopardizing the
viability of the shipyard until the next growth cycle.
2. COMPLEXITY OP THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS
Ship construction is a complex operation because a
ship is a highly specialized product that requires a
significant amount of time to complete. Shipyard management
has the responsibility to coordinate thousands of workers in
the completion of work packages that can number in the tens of
thousands. The workers must be trained and supervised. In
addition to the worker scheduling effort, there must also be
coordination with subcontractors and the shipyard supplier
industry to deliver material, components, and equipment when
and where they are needed. Due to the serial nature of
shipbuilding, delays in any area can impact on the completion
of the ship and, thereby, impact on the productivity of the
shipyard [Ref. 2:pp. 10 - 11].
Furthermore, the physical composition of shipyards
(i.e., quays, berths, etc.) makes it extremely difficult for
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shipyards to convert their efforts from ship construction to
some other business using the same facilities. Thus, once a
firm is committed to shipbuilding, it cannot easily convert
the business without considerable expense and time.
Consequently, a shipyard's business strategy during industry-
wide downturns usually requires the firm to ride out the slump
[Ref. ll:p. 49].
3. CAPITAL AND LABOR REQUIREMENTS
Commercial and naval shipbuilding require major
infusions of capital and labor [Ref. 12:p. 87]. Capital is
required in order to purchase, maintain, and modernize
shipbuilding facilities, to procure the raw material,
subassemblies, and equipment from the shipyard supplier base,
and to finance other shipbuilding operations such as payrolls,
utilities, and taxes. Prior to 1945, shipyards
characteristically manufactured the entire ship in-house and
used purchased components sparingly. Increasingly, however,
more and more of the subassemblies and equipment are purchased
from outside sources. This trend is turning the shipbuilding
industry from a manufacturing-oriented business to an assembly
and erection industry [Ref. 12:p. 96].
Labor is another major resource used in the
construction of modern ocean-going vessels. Like capital,
labor is used in large quantities. Direct labor costs can
account for as much as fifty percent of the finished cost of
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a ship [Ref. 12 :p. 107]. Shipyards must hire, train, and
maintain a work force capable of performing the myriad of
tasks required by modern naval technology (i.e., fabrication,
assembly, production, and management) . Labor skills required
include: welders, shipfitters, joiners, painters, machinists,
electricians, and pipefitters.
Due to the cyclic nature of the industry, however, it
is becoming increasingly difficult to attract and retain
skilled workers when job security is all but nonexistent [Ref.
12:p. 102]. The labor force is typically one of the areas
targeted for cutbacks when shipyards experience a downturn in
total construction and repair business. Released workers tend
to find work in another industry in the same area, rather than
relocate geographically to a new area in order to remain in
the shipbuilding industry [Ref. ll:p. 59].
4. NATIONAL DEFENSE ISSUES
The uncompetitiveness of American shipyards combined
with the expected decline in shipyard capability present grave
national defense issues. International trade is an important
aspect of the U.S. economy. As the world's largest trading
economy, American industry and consumers depend on foreign
trade for raw materials, semi-finished, and finished products.
In turn, foreign markets provide sales opportunities for
American businesses. Since practically all international
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trade is carried on ships, shipbuilding and shipping become
national defense issues [Ref. 12 :p. 3].
Aside from the issues of trade, adequate shipbuilding
capacity and sealift capability are required in order to meet
defense commitments to foreign governments as well as to
protect the worldwide strategic interests of the United
States. Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, there are
other threats in the world which can have a devastating impact
on the U.S. or her allies (i.e., another regional war such as
Desert Storm or a second oil embargo by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC]). A less sinister
scenario, but no less damaging in its potential, is the growth
of "trading blocs." A trading bloc which controls a large
portion of the world's merchant fleet could control that fleet
to the disadvantage of blocs reliant upon those bottoms (i.e.,
shipping rates could be manipulated in a manner just short of
a trade war). U.S. shipyard capability is protection against
a reliance on foreign shipyards to fulfill the needs of U.S.
shipping in peace or war.
The loss of shipbuilding orders by U.S. shipyards also
hits the shipbuilding support industry. Marine suppliers who
are unable to maintain their profitability by supporting the
U.S. shipbuilding industry will either go out of business or
convert to another line of business. Table 2 shows some of
the items which must currently be purchased from foreign
sources due to a lack of domestic sources of supply.
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Table 2. TYPICAL FOREIGN PROCUREMENTS.
ITEM SHIP CLASS COUNTRY
Arresting Gear Engines CVN-68 Netherlands
Propellers T-AGOS 1 Japan
Quiet Ball Bearings SSN 688, SSBN
726, CG 47
Japan
Turbochargers T-AO 187 Switzerland
Diesel Generator Sets T-AO 187 Norway





MCM 1, MHC 1 Italy
Air Compressors T-AO 187 Great
Britain
Power Supplies CVN 68 Denmark
Periscope Lens Material SSN 637, SSN
688
Germany











Anchor Chain, 4-3/4" CVN 68 Sweden
Air Circuit Breakers CG 47 Great
Britain
Degaussing Systems MCM 1 Great
Britain
[Ref. 20:p. 169]
With a further decline of U.S. Navy construction, a
further contraction of U.S. shipyard capability, and a
27
continuing lack of commercial merchant shipbuilding orders,
the length of Table 2 is expected to grow. Each item added to
the list is an indication that U.S. naval construction is
becoming increasingly dependent on foreign sources of supply.
Furthermore, a growing foreign purchase list indicates a
shrinking U.S. shipbuilding supplier base. Both indicators
are a cause for alarm given a wartime scenario.
C. U.S. SHIPYARDS
Aside from the Clipper era, the United States has never
been either a dominant shipbuilder or shipowner in a peacetime
environment [Ref. 19:p. 297]. World War Two was the high
water mark for America's shipbuilders. This boom in
construction followed the stagnated period during the Great
Depression where the U.S. merchant ship production had reached
a low of 63,000 tons in 1935 [Ref. ll:p. 50]. The importance
of Navy work to U.S. shipbuilders grew significantly in the
years just prior to America's entry into World War Two as
President Roosevelt began to prepare the nation for war. Navy
work in the shipyards continued to grow throughout the war.
In June 1940, only six private yards were doing Navy work, but
by the end of 1941, 68 yards were building naval vessels. The
peak was reached in 1943, when the number of ships built in
U.S. yards was greater than the total built during the
preceding twenty-five years [Ref. ll:p. 49-51].
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Throughout the war, shipyard capacity was expanded by over
4 00 percent. Twenty-one emergency shipyards were built by the
Maritime Commission. In addition, forty-three private yards
were financed by the Maritime Commission while eighty yards
were financed by the Navy for a total of $851,000,000
[Ref. ll:pp. 49 - 52], At the conclusion of the war, excess
shipyard capacity was quickly eliminated.
There are several observations with regard to trends in
U.S. shipyards since 1945. First, U.S. shipyards have been
uncompetitive in the world shipbuilding market despite the
great advantage obtained during the war. Second, due to the
declining commercial market, U.S. shipyard work has been
shifting from commercial to Navy construction. Third, U.S.
yards have been concentrating more effort on repair work than
new construction as their order books go empty. Fourth, there
is increasing competition between private and public yards for
Navy overhaul and repair work as the commercial market
opportunities continue to shrink for U.S. shipyards. Each of
these trends are discussed below.
1. Uncompetitiveness of U.S. Shipyards
Since 1960 the U.S. has not been able to obtain more
than a few percent of the world's shipbuilding market share
[Ref. 19:p. 294]. U.S. shipyards have basically priced
themselves out of the world commercial shipbuilding market
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Figure 3. World Percentage of Commercial Vessel Tonnage
on Order 1 January 1978. [Ref. 21: p. 11]
posture. Figure 3 shows commercial vessels on order in 1978
prior to the commencement of the Reagan naval buildup in the
U.S. Figure 4 shows commercial ships on order in 1990
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following ten years of concentrated U.S. naval construction
and eight years after the elimination of U.S. Construction










Figure 4. Commercial Vessel Tonnage on Order 31 December
1990. [Ref. 15:p. 18]
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shipbuilders' percentage of the world commercial shipbuilding
market fell from 6.5 to .7 percent.
A contributing factor to the decline in U.S. yards was
their reliance on federal support [Ref. 12:p. 85]. Federal
assistance to U.S. shipyards included Construction
Differential Subsidies (CDS) , cabotage laws, tax benefits, and
Government construction programs (Navy and Coast Guard)
.
Chapter III discusses federal involvement in further detail.
Labor rate growth in the U.S. has also played a part
in the declining competitiveness of U.S. shipyards. When
direct labor accounts for up to fifty percent of the finished
price of a ship, labor rates become significant in terms of a
shipyard's competitiveness. The U.S. shipbuilding industry is
heavily unionized and is noted for its lack of incentive pay
systems [Ref. 22:p. 56]. During the five-year period between
1975 and 1980, U.S. shipbuilding labor rates increased 57
percent. Conversely, labor rates only increased by 2 6 percent
in Japan and by 38 percent in West Germany over the same
timeframe [Ref. 12:p. 105]. Recent data, however, indicate
that the U.S is very competitive in shipbuilding compensation
costs as illustrated in Table 3.
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TABLE 3. SHIPBUILDING HOURLY
FRINGES) . (MEASURED
COMPENSATION COSTS (INCLUDING
IN DOLLARS PER MAN-HOUR)
COUNTRY 1988 1989 1990
GERMANY $20.89 $20.16 $26.50
NORWAY 19.88 19.63 24.36
DENMARK 16.99 16.23 21.86
NETHERLANDS 15.87 N/A 21.70
ITALY 14.62 15.10 19.22
FRANCE 14.51 14.09 18.60
JAPAN 14.83 14.67 15.80
USA 14.33 14.77 15.50
U.K. 9.89 10.06 12.55
KOREA 4.40 6.35 10.00
[Ref. 23:p. 37]
2. Shift from Commercial to Navy Work
Due to their lack of competitiveness on the world
market, the big five U.S. shipyards have steadily been moving
out of commercial shipbuilding and into the Navy repair and
construction markets. Figure 5 illustrates this point
graphically. Like all businesses which rely on one source of
income, the big five U.S. shipyards have become dependent on
Navy work for their livelihood. Consequently, their profits,
losses, and health currently depend on the Navy's construction
and repair budget. For the past several years, Naval
construction has supported approximately ninety percent of the
work at the top five U.S. shipyards [Ref. l:p. 3]. According
to a 1990 Shipbuilders Council Survey, of the $1,632 billion
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Figure 5. Commercial and Naval Ships on Order (19 69 -
1991). [Ref. 15:pp. 5-9 and Ref. 16:pp. 52 - 53]
spent in U.S. shipyards for repair, $1,200 billion or 73.5
percent came from Navy and Coast Guard sources [Ref. 24:
p. 20] .
3. Growth of Repair/Specialty Work over Construction
Several major U.S. shipyards, unable to attract either
Navy or commercial shipbuilding contracts, have become more
and more reliant on repair and specialty work as a matter of
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survival. Private shipyards spent approximately $300 million
for improvements in 1983 — most of it for repair and
conversion facilities. Like the construction side of the
industry, only a few yards account for the vast majority of
repair dollars [Ref. 14 :p. 20].
A major source of federal repair work comes from the
Navy's repair and modernization program which has been
declining in recent years due to changes in the Navy's
maintenance policy and due to the increased reliability of
Navy ships achieved by the Reliability Improvement Program.
A second major source of federal repair work comes
from the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) which consists
of 220 merchant ships and 30 naval vessels. A subset of the
NDRF is the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) which is maintained in
a higher state of readiness than the NDRF as a whole. The RRF
is scheduled to contain 142 ships by FY 1995. Average annual
maintenance expenditures for each RRF ship is estimated by
MARAD to total $1 million. Activation, conversion, and
maintenance of the ships to be added to the RRF is expected to
run approximately $60 million per year [Ref. l:pp. 4-5].
Additional repair funding has resulted from Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. The activation and deactivation of
78 RRF ships in support of these operations will result in
approximately $330 million worth of business for 25 U.S.
shipyards. Furthermore, test-training activations over the
next three years could result in another $250 million for U.S.
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shipyards [Ref. l:p. 5]. Although the work from Desert
Shield/Storm is significant, from a long term perspective,
this is only a one time source for work for U.S. shipyards.
Repair revenues in U.S. yards for the years 1988 through 1990
are shown below in Table 4
.
Table 4. REPAIR REVENUES (MILLIONS) IN U.S. SHIPYARDS
(1988 - 1990) .
Source 1988 1989 1990
Government $1,238.0 $1,091.1 $41,119.3
Commercial $201.8 $278.7 $373.3
[Ref. 25:p. 3]
4. Competition Between Private and Public Yards
With the decline in commercial shipping contracts has
come a demand by private shipyards for a greater share of the
Navy's repair work. In FY 1974, Congress established a
ceiling of 70 percent for repair and modernization work in
public shipyards. The remaining 3 percent had to be
competitively awarded to private shipyards. The competition
program was expanded by the Navy in FY 1986. Since that time,
public shipyards have won the majority of the nuclear
submarine repair availabilities while private shipyards have
won the majority of the non-nuclear surface ship repair
availabilities [Ref. 26:p. 8].
The percentage of repair and modernization funds
awarded to private yards for FY 1989 through FY 1991 is
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presented in Table 5. The distribution of repair
availabilities (i.e., Phased Maintenance Availabilities -
PMAs, Scheduled Maintenance Availabilities - SRAs, and
Restricted Overhauls - ROHs) to public and private shipyards
during the period 1982 through 1989 is presented in Table 6
and Figures 6 and 7
.
Table 5. REPAIR AND MODERNIZATION WORK AWARDED TO PRIVATE











Future public/private competitions could be affected
by the closure of Philadelphia and Long Beach Naval Shipyards.
Normally a decrease in public shipyard capacity would tend to
result in an increase in work for other shipyards (public or
private) . This may not be true, however, in a period where
the size of the Navy fleet is declining. Consequently, it is
still too early to tell what impact the closure of these two
public yards will have on future competitions [Ref. l:p. 4].
Over the course of American history, U.S. shipyards have
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Figure 6. Distribution of Repair Availabilities at Public
Yards. [Ref. 26:p. 5]
American-built ships. Peaks during the Clipper Age and the
First and Second World Wars were followed just as quickly by
deep troughs of stagnated demand. The decline in U.S.
shipbuilding supremacy from the end of the Second World War to
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Figure 7. Distribution of Repair Availabilities at Private
Yards. [Ref. 26:p. 5]
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III. CAUSES OF THE DECLINE
The decline of U.S. shipyards since the end of World War
Two can be attributed to four major causes. These include:
overcapacity within the industry, the cyclic nature of the
industry, foreign competition, and U.S. influences. This
chapter will address each of these issues in detail.
A. OVERCAPACITY
Overcapacity is the primary reason for the decline in the
numbers and the decline in the capacity of U.S. shipyards from
their peak during the Second World War. At the war's end, the
U.S. had capacity far in excess of peacetime demand. In
addition, at the conclusion of the war, there was a glut of
merchant ships available for peacetime use. This glut further
depressed demand for new ship orders. Conseguently, the
industry had to downsize to a level more aligned with
peacetime demand.
Another factor contributing to overcapacity was the
rebuilding of foreign shipyards in those countries that had
been devastated by the war. Japanese and European yards were
brought back into production not only to support their
domestic shipping needs (and national policy in the case of
Japan) , but also to gain hard currency by selling new ships to
the world's shipowners. Japan became a significant
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shipbuilding force by 1950, was overtaking Great Britain by
1958, and commanded 50 percent of the world merchant
shipbuilding market by 1969 [Ref. 19:p. 291].
The growth of national airlines in the early 1950s further
exacerbated overcapacity. By 1952 several national airlines
had established long distance routes that cut into the liner
market [Ref. 5:p. 260]. As the airline industry matured,
fewer and fewer liner passenger miles were demanded, equating
to a softer and softer demand for new passenger liners.
The mid-1950s and early 1960s witnessed a growing demand
for oil by the industrialized nations. This demand absorbed
the excess supply of tankers which were present at the end of
the Second World War and generated a new growth cycle in
tanker builds.
The 1960s and early 1970s were the modern "golden age of
shipbuilding." New merchant ship orders, particularly
tankers, rose to record levels. Tanker demand soared in 19 67
following the closure of the Suez Canal and rose constantly
from 1968 through 1973 [Ref. 27:pp. 5-7]. European and
Japanese shipbuilding capacity increased by 136 and 650
percent, respectively, over a ten-year span in response to (1)
growing demand for ocean transportation, (2) national
initiatives to promote industrialization and employment
[Ref. 27:p. 7], and (3) market responses for the unprecedented
world-wide merchant ship demand. [Ref. 21:p. 10].
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Japan capitalized on this new demand by mastering mass
production techniques, reducing construction times, and
offering attractive financing [Ref. 27:pp. 5 - 7],
Conversely, total U.S. merchant ship construction remained
relatively stable. From 1973 to 1982, U.S. shipyards averaged
less than 5 percent of the total world commercial tonnage
[Ref. 12:p. 89]. Tanker demand nose dived after the 1973 oil
embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) . From 1977 through 1988 demand for oil dropped 28
percent.
Tanker tonnage demand over the same period dropped 51
percent [Ref. 27:p. 9]. Since tankers had accounted for more
than half of the new ship orders during this modern "golden
age," shipyards found themselves with serious excess capacity
[Ref. 21:p. 10].
Coupled with the tremendous drop in tanker demand was the
modest growth in seaborne trade from 1979 to 1989. Oil
tonnage dropped at an average of 2 percent per year while dry
cargo tonnage rose at a rate of 2 percent per year [Ref. 17:
p. 45] . Nominal growth in demand for seaborne transportation
virtually eliminates the need for new capacity requirements on
the part of shipowners. Replacement demand, then, becomes the
primary order type shipowners place with shipyards. Given
these market conditions, it is not surprising that world
shipbuilding capacity by 1989 was 25 percent less than that in
1970 [Ref. 28:p. 26].
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B. CYCLIC NATURE OF THE INDUSTRY
As mentioned previously, the world shipbuilding industry
is known for wild oscillations between periods of feast and
famine. The primary cause of these oscillations is world
trade. If world trade grows annually, the demand for new
shipping will continue to grow year by year. New demand is
created by the need for more capacity on the part of
shipowners as well as the need to replace older, less
efficient vessels. If, on the other hand, world trade
declines for a period of several years, demand for new
shipping can dry up completely. Due to the need for less
capacity, shipowners can retire their older vessels without
replacing them [Ref. 19:p. 304]. When this occurs, new ship
orders will drop precipitously.
While shipyards can possibly survive with inefficiencies
during periods where demand for new ships exceeds the
industry's capacity to build them, such inefficiencies tend to
make these shipyards less competitive during periods of
declining demand. It is the periods between peak to trough
that are the biggest challenge to shipyard management.
Shipyards must be able to maintain their facilities and their
people during these slowdown periods without going bankrupt.
Economic theory would predict that the less efficient
shipyards in America are the ones that go out of business
during periods of weak demand.
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C. FOREIGN COMPETITION
To be competitive in the world shipbuilding market, U.S.
shipyards must be able to meet or beat the quality and the
prices for new ships offered by the world competition. To
accomplish this feat, U.S. shipyards must overcome distinct
disadvantages in labor rates and foreign government
involvement.
1. LABOR RATES
Traditional thinking on factors that contribute to
strong shipbuilding industries include a country's labor
rates. As labor costs can account for anywhere from 4 to 50
percent of the final cost of a ship, labor rates are a key
element in the bottom line calculation of a ship's total cost
[Ref. 12:p. 107]. Labor rates, then, can significantly affect
the final price of a new ship. Using this rationale, the
movement of shipbuilding strength from Great Britain and
Western Europe to Japan and to newly developing countries like
Korea can be explained, particularly since labor rates in both
Japan and Korea were well below those of the U.S. and Europe
in the twenty years following the Second World War. As labor
rates climbed in the United States and Europe, their shipyards
became less competitive with these emerging shipbuilding
countries.
Although labor rates are important in that they
significantly contribute to the total cost of a new build,
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labor rates alone do not determine the competitiveness of one
shipyard against another. Japan too began to lose market
share for new builds as Japanese labor rates outpaced those of
South Korea. In 1987 , South Korea's share of worldwide orders
hit an all time high of 30 percent, while Japan's 34 percent
share in the same year reflected a 2 year low. By early
1989, however, Japan's market share reached 4 5 percent of
worldwide orders while South Korea's had dropped to 27
percent. This dramatic turnaround is attributable not only to
the 60 percent rise in South Korean wages over the two-year
period, but it is also due to the generous wage contracts
being negotiated in South Korea's steel industry which further
escalated the cost of South Korean ships [Ref. 29:p. 134].
Thus, although labor rates are important to being a
competitive shipbuilder on the world market, other costs also
play a part in the total cost equation for a new ship,
impacting a nation's shipbuilding competitiveness.
2. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
U.S. shipyards must also compete on the basis of
advantages offered to foreign shipyards by their respective
governments. These advantages take the form of subsidies,
shipyard ownership, and other forms of involvement.
a. Subsidies
Numerous foreign governments have decided that
shipbuilding is in their national interests. Some of these
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governments have also determined that their shipyards are not
as efficient as the foreign competition. Consequently, these
governments have decided to subsidize their own shipyards in
order to keep them open and active in the shipbuilding trade.
Foreign subsidies vary by country with regard to the types and
magnitude of the subsidies available. Although a complete
analysis and comparison of foreign subsidies is beyond the
scope of this paper, the following subsidies are the most
common found in the major shipbuilding countries of the world.
(1) Ship Financing Subsidies . Ship financing
subsidies aid foreign buyers (export credits) or domestic
buyers (home credits) in the purchase of ships built by the
country providing the subsidy. Examples of ship financing
subsidies include: loans, interest subsidies, and/or loan
guarantees. The loan guarantees may be supported by various
government entities including federal, regional, and state
institutions and these guarantees may be either fully or
partially supported. Government assisted finance programs
exist in Japan, South Korea, and Europe [Ref. 30 :p. 5].
(2) Ship Production Subsidies . Ship production
subsidies take the form of direct cash infusion into a
shipyard to cover a percentage of a contract price for a new
build, repair, or conversion. This form of subsidy is
prevalent in Europe and was established to maintain the
competitiveness of the European yards with those yards outside
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the European community, particularly those in the Far East
[Ref. 30:p. 9]. The ceilings on these types of subsidies are
set by the European Community (EC) Commission. Member
governments are then supposed to abide by the limits
established. These ceilings, however, do not apply to
shipbuilding grants and financial aid provided to ship buyers
from Less Developed Countries (LDCs) [Ref. 31:p. 3].
The EC's Sixth Directive detailed policies
and regulations on ship production aid, investment and
restructuring aid, and some forms of indirect aid for the
period January 1, 1987 through December 31, 1990. Subsidy
ceilings for the four-year period based on contract prices
were: 28% (1987), 28% (1988), 26% (1989), and 20% (1990). The
Directive allowed the ceilings to be set annually and excluded
Spain and Portugal through 1990 [Ref. 30:p. 9].
The EC's Seventh Directive calls for the
progressive removal of shipbuilding subsidies by EC members.
In this vein, the EC lowered the maximum rate of government
subsidies for 1992 from 13 to 9 percent [Ref. 32:p. 4].
(3) Restructuring and Investment Aid.
Restructuring and investment aid provides
direct financial assistance to a shipyard. Modernization,
restructuring, and downsizing are common purposes for this
type of subsidy. A recent example of this type of subsidy is
the Canadian Government's offer to help British Columbian
47
shipyards reduce capacity or close down yards by paying half
of the cost [Ref. 33: p. 3].
Financial aid, however, can also be provided
to keep a shipyard in business. Restructuring and investment
aid can take the form of loan subsidies and guarantees, cash
infusions, government purchases of excess or obsolete
equipment, tax benefits, debt bail-outs, or other actions
which assist the shipyard in covering operating losses. Major
restructuring and investment programs exist in Japan, South
Korea, Germany, and Italy [Ref. 30:pp. 11 - 12].
(4) Research and Development (R&D) . All of the
major foreign shipbuilding countries provide some sort of
research and development assistance to their respective
shipbuilding industries. Germany provides funds to both
shipyards and to research institutes and universities for
shipbuilding R&D. South Korean R&D efforts focus on ship
design automation. Denmark emphasizes shipbuilding research
and technological vessel development. Finally, Italy funds
research in ship design and propulsion systems, and pays up to
half the cost of prototypes [Ref. 30:pp. 15 - 18].
Perhaps the strongest shipbuilding R&D
effort is being made by the Japanese. The close cooperation
between industry, government, and universities has helped
produce efficiencies in directing and promoting shipbuilding
R&D, the results of which are reflected in Japan's share of
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the world shipbuilding market. Prior to 1974, Japan had
concentrated on lowering production and operating costs.
Later, emphasis was placed on technological innovation
following recommendations by Japan's Council for
Rationalization of the Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries
(CRSSI) . CRSSI is comprised of representatives from the
government, shipbuilders, and shipowners and acts as an
advisory council to the Ministry of Transport (MOT) [Ref. 19:
p. 295].
There are other government sponsors of R&D
in Japan as well. The Council for Transport Technology (CTT)
has promoted the development of artificial intelligence and
high reliability in modern vessels. A propellerless ship has
been designed by the Japan Foundation for Shipbuilding
Advancement with the aid of government research funding. The
Association for Structural Improvement of the Shipbuilding
Industry was set up by the government in 1989 to identify and
fund R&D projects which are considered to be too risky for
industry. Furthermore, the Japanese government has funded the
Ship Research Institute (SRI) since 1963. SRI's research and
testing is done in consonance with policies formulated by the
MOT [Ref. 30:p. 15].
b. Government Ownership Interest.
Government ownership interest in foreign shipyards
makes it highly probable that operating losses will be covered
49
and that government policies will be developed which will keep
the shipyard in business. Government ownership interest in
shipyards exists in Germany, Italy, and Spain. The German
government has provided around $254 million to Germany's
primary shipbuilding groups, Bremer Vulkan and Howaldtswerke
Deutsche Werft (HDW) , between 1987 and 1990. The state of
Bremen owns approximately 26.1% of Bremer Vulkan as well as
ownership interest in other German yards. Similarly, the
state of Schleswig-Holstein also has ownership interest in
several German yards. Additional government assistance has
been provided in the form of grant and financing aid for
shipbuilding contracts from LDCs. Currently, neither the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
nor the EC limit the amount of subsidization that governments
can provide for ship contracts placed by owners from LDCs
[Ref. 34:p. 20].
The Italian government owns approximately 70
percent of that country's shipbuilding capacity and is
expected to cover losses which have been growing since 1987.
Similarly, the Spanish government is expected to foot the bill
for public yard losses totalling around $1.6 billion for the
period 1987 through 1990 [Ref. 34:p. 20].
c. Other Government Involvement.
In addition to the financial assistance provided to
their domestic yards, foreign governments aid their industries
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in other ways. Again the Japanese government provides the
most assistance and direction as well as the most
restrictions. Decisions on the tonnage to be built, the type
of ships to build, the shipyards to get the contracts and the
liner firms to get the new ships are all made by the Ministry
of Transport (MOT) in consultation with the Shipping and
Shipbuilding Rationalization Council [Ref. 19:p. 295]. This
government involvement, with the advice of industry leaders,
keeps Japan's shipping and shipbuilding industries strong.
Government and industry cooperation resulted in the closure of
40 percent of Japan's yards in 1988 [Ref. 29:p. 134].
Cutting capacity to bring it into line with demand
gave the remaining shipyards a better opportunity to remain
healthy during the lean times. Reducing capacity also reduced
the likelihood that the remaining shipyards would engage in
cut-throat competition to the detriment of the industry as a
whole. Since the severe shipbuilding depression of the 1980s,
the Japanese government has not allowed medium-sized yards to
build very large crude oil carriers although MOT has recently
agreed to study the issue [Ref. 35:p. 4].
Another non-financial example of foreign
governments assisting their domestic shipyards and other
industries is the practice of tying foreign aid for capital
projects to domestic goods and services. Japan, Germany,
France, and Great Britain all provide about fifty percent of
their foreign aid in the form of domestic goods and services.
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Conversely, the United States only provides about eight
percent [Ref. 31: p. 3].
D. U.S. INFLUENCES
Foreign competition is but one reason for the decline in
U.S. shipyards. Domestic factors have also contributed to the
decline in the areas of productivity, legislation, and the
growth of Navy work during the worldwide shipyard decline in
the 1980s.
1. PRODUCTIVITY
U.S. shipyard productivity in the commercial market
has not kept pace with the major shipbuilding powers of Japan
and Korea. The reasons for this failure are many. First, the
Japanese and Korean yards began their rise to world class
shipbuilders with cheap labor possessing a strong work ethic.
As previously addressed, this low cost of labor gave the
Japanese and Korean yards a distinct advantage in the world
market due to the significant amount of direct labor hours
that are required in the manufacture and assembly of merchant
vessels. U.S. yards, on the other hand, faced rising labor
costs as unions successfully negotiated more lucrative wage
contracts backdropped against the rising U.S. standard of
living.
The second reason that U.S. yards were unable to keep
up with the Japanese and Korean yards' productivity is the
support that these foreign yards received from governmental
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sources that the U.S. yards did not receive in turn.
Following the Second World War, the Japanese government
targeted the merchant shipping industry as an area for intense
government oversight. The extent of this strong government
support can be seen in the loans provided by the Japan
Development Bank during the period 1951 - 1972 where marine
transportation constituted 31.5 percent of the total loans
made [Ref. 19:p. 295]. Other governmental support to Japanese
and South Korean yards has already been discussed.
Shipyard layout and age are a third reason for the
lagging of U.S. productivity to foreign yards. While most
foreign yards were rebuilt at the end of the Second World War,
U.S. yards, with the exception of Pearl Harbor, were untouched
by enemy action. Consequently, of the major shipyards in the
U.S., one-third are over 100 years old and all but one exceeds
65 years of age [Ref. 12:p. 99]. Furthermore, the layout of
these old yards does not lend itself to the modern
manufacturing technique of modular construction. As a result,
U.S. yards tend to employ lower levels of technology than do
foreign yards. A 1983 Office of Technology Assessment report
identified numerous shortfalls in U.S. shipyard productivity
vis-a-vis Japanese and Korean shipyards. The OTA report notes
weaknesses in:
technological investment, research and development (R&D)
investment, use of labor, tooling, degree of automation
and use of robotics, and application of modern automated
management and control techniques, as well as in the
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methods of processing, joining, and assembly [Ref. 12:
p. 97].
Some of the disparity between U.S. and foreign
shipyard productivity can be explained in terms of the amount
of aid which each government provides to domestic shipyards.
The governments of Japan, South Korea, and Germany have
proposed or budgeted a combined total of over $12 billion in
commercial shipbuilding-related aid since 1987. In
comparison, the U.S. government has provided only $4.6 million
— its contribution to the National Shipbuilding Research
Program [Ref. 36:p. 2], Government aid in itself does not
enhance productivity. However, financial aid can produce
productivity improvement incentives depending on how the aid
rules are written.
Despite the investment of over $4.6 billion in new
plant and equipment since 1970, U.S. shipyards are still not
competitive with either Japanese or Korean shipyards for
commercial merchant ship builds 1 . Capital investment in the
U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry for the period 1985
through 1991 is shown in Figure 8 [Ref. 16:p. 56].
With regard to the use of the yards, foreign
shipyards, particularly those in Korea and Japan, have seen
considerably more business than have the yards in the United
1 Vice Admiral Hekman, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command,
stated in testimony before the House Armed Services Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee in 1990 that U.S.
shipyards could build warships cheaper than Japan [Ref. 20:p. 186].
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Figure 8. Capital Investments in the U.S. Shipbuilding
and Repair Industry (1985 - 1991). [Ref. I6:p. 56]
States. This is attributable in part to the pursuit by these
yards of markets that have the highest volume of ship demand
[Ref. 12:p. 85]. A large business volume makes series
production possible. In turn, series production means that
learning curve gains are achievable, that technological
processes can be perfected, that profits are being generated
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to improve the shipyards' capability, and that the work force
(labor and management) is keeping their basic skills honed and
are presented with opportunities to improve their skills.
Other advantages with consistently high volume work include
the maintenance of the supplier industries with the resulting
employment, labor skills, and strengthened industrial base2 .
In comparison to Korean and Japanese shipyards, U.S.
shipyards have experienced a marked decline in commercial
shipbuilding business. Japanese and Korean shipyards have
climbed from 2 6.2 percent and 2.8 percent of the world
commercial shipbuilding market (DWT) in 1978 to 38.3 percent
and 17.6 percent, respectively in mid-1991 [Ref. l:p. 1] . In
comparison, U.S. shipyards went from 6.5 percent of world
orders for commercial vessel tonnage in early 1978 [Ref. 21:
p. 11] to only had seven-tenths of one percent by mid-1991
[Ref. l:p. 1]. This lack of business has placed U.S. yards
further behind the world competition as U.S. yards are reaping
none of the aforementioned benefits of series production. It
becomes increasingly more and more difficult for U.S.
shipyards to compete in the world market when the competition
can underbid U.S. quotes at virtually every opportunity.
2 These last two points, labor skills and the industrial base,
are particularly critical in the construction of nuclear powered
naval vessels [Ref. 20:pp. 163 & 306].
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2. LEGISLATION
U.S. legislation has played a significant role in the
present condition of American shipyards. Congress and the
President have enacted legislation to both the benefit and the
detriment of U.S. shipbuilders.
a. Beneficial Legislation
Beneficial legislation, from the perspective of the
shipbuilders, provides business opportunities and protection
from competition. The economic ramifications that this
legislation has on U.S. shipowners, carriers, and shippers is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it must be noted
that shipbuilding legislation does impact directly and
indirectly on other industries within the United States. What
is good for U.S. shipbuilders is not necessarily good for
these other industries.
(1) Military Transport Act of 1904. Shipments
in support of U.S. Armed Forces overseas must be carried on
U.S. -flag ships pursuant to this act. Fifty percent of the
military cargo covered by this Act is also impacted by the
Cargo Preference Act in subparagraph (6) below. That is,
Military Sealift Command cannot use Government owned or
controlled vessels to ship more than 50 percent of its cargo
[Ref. 12:p. 183].
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(2) Jones Act of 1920. The Jones Act requires
that ships in the domestic trades (coastwise, intercoastal,
noncontiguous, and inland waterway trades) be built in U.S.
shipyards and that the ships be under U.S. registry [Ref. 12:
p. 76]. Domestic shipyard construction also applies to
specialty vessels (dredges, towboats, salvaging vessels,
hovercraft, and inflatable rafts) used in the domestic trades
[Ref. 37:p. 28 and Ref. 38:p. 51]. Furthermore, rebuilt
vessels over 500 gross tons participating in the domestic
trades must have been rebuilt in U.S. shipyards [Ref. 37:
p. 28]. Vessels under 500 gross tons may lose their right to
participate in the domestic trades if they are re-built abroad
or re-built in - the United States using foreign material
extensively [Ref. 38:p. 52].
(3) Tariff Act of 1930. This Act adds a 50
percent ad valorem tax on non-emergency repairs to U.S. owned
ships outside of the United States and on imported equipment
for boats, including fishing nets [Ref. 38:p. 51]. Basically,
this Act is designed to protect the U.S. shipbuilding
industry.
(4) Buy American Act (BAA) . The Buy American
Act was originally enacted in 1933 and is directed at
restricting the public sector from procuring foreign goods or
limiting the procurement of specific goods containing foreign
labor or material based on content formulas [Ref. 38:pp. 29 -
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30]. The BAA is incorporated into several U.S. maritime laws.
For government subsidized ships, the Buy American Act mandates
that at least 50 percent of the machinery and materials be of
U.S. manufacture [Ref. 12:p. 108],
(5) Public Resolution 17. This legislation,
enacted in 1934 [Ref. 38:p. 79], requires that 100 percent of
U.S. Government generated cargoes, financed by Government
loans to foster exports, must be carried on U.S. -flag ships
[Ref. 12:p. 182]. U.S. Government loans refer to those made
by the Export-Import Bank for exportation of U.S. goods
[Ref. 39:p. 161].
(6) Cargo Preference Act of 1954. This act
applies to U.S. Government impelled cargoes. Military cargoes
must be shipped using government or privately owned U.S. -flag
vessels [Ref. 14:p. 11], while at least 50 percent of other
federal agency cargoes must be shipped in U.S. privately owned
vessels [Ref. 12 :p. 182] when they are available at fair and
reasonable rates [Ref. 39:p. 161].
(7) Burnes-Tollifson Amendment. This 1964
change to Section 7309, Title 10, United States Code requires
that U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels be built in U.S.
shipyards, including small inflatable rafts and boats
[Ref. 38:p. 25].
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(8) Food Security Act of 1985. This act, when
applicable, requires that 75 percent of shipments for the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and the Agency for International
Development (AID) be shipped on U.S. -flag ships [Ref. 37:
p. 28]. Under this Act the Department of Agriculture was
required to use one billion dollars worth of Commodity Credit
Corporation stocks to subsidize exports of U.S. farm products.
From FY 85 through FY 91, this Act impacted shipments
totalling approximately 94.2 million tons of wheat, 3.1
million tons of wheat flour, and 10.3 million tons of feed
grain [Ref. 38:p. 55].
(9) Trade Act of 1988. Section 301 of this act,
commonly called Super 301, allowed the Executive branch to
impose trade sanctions on foreign countries who participated
in unfair trade practices. The Shipbuilders Council of
America filed a grievance under this act in 1989 [Ref. 40:
p. 82] to U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills for shipyard
subsidies being provided by West Germany, Japan, South Korea,
and Norway [Ref. 41:p. 88].
(10) Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This act applies
to oil tankers entering U.S. waters. The act, among other
things, requires that tankers ordered after June 30, 1991 must
have double hulls. Furthermore, existing tankers face a
phase-out period based on gross tonnage and age such that all
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single hull tankers must be replaced by the year 2010 [Ref.42:
p. 26] .
b. Detrimental Influences
Detrimental Federal executive and legislative
action make it more difficult for U.S. shipbuilders to attract
business. The following examples are indicative of
legislation which has hurt U.S. shipbuilders.
(1) Construction Differential Subsidies . As
previously described, CDS were a part of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 and were intended to offset the higher cost of
building merchant vessels in U.S. shipyards. Although the
legal limit of 50 percent was not sufficient to cover the
higher costs being experienced in the 1980s, the Secretary of
Transportation stopped requesting CDS funding from Congress in
FY 1982 [Ref. 12:p. 154]. This action eliminated an
alternative available to U.S. ship buyers while, at the same
time, no action was taken by foreign governments to stop their
subsidy programs.
(2) Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1991.
The Credit Reform Act portion of this bill requires the
passing of authorizations and appropriations prior to
government agencies guaranteeing private debt. Whether or not
this act applies to Title XI financing has yet to be
determined [Ref. 43:p. 1]. However, the act has already
impacted U.S. shipyards in that the Crowley Maritime
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Corporation withdrew its request for a $450 million Title XI
mortgage guarantee when the Maritime Administration failed to
act on the request prior to the Omnibus Act becoming effective
on 1 October 1991 [Ref. 44:p. 3]. Crowley requested the Title
XI guarantee to help finance ten new double hull tankers for
use in the domestic trades [Ref. 45:p. 63].
(3) Super 301 Provision of the Trade Act of
1988. Although this was listed as beneficial legislation
above, the Super 301 portion of the Act expired in 1990 3 [Ref.
46:p. 2F] . Consequently, U.S. industry has one less avenue of
attack against governments who allow unfair barriers to
foreign trade.
3. NAVY WORK GROWTH
While the shipbuilding industry was experiencing a
drop in worldwide demand in the 1980s, the United States Navy
was beginning its largest peacetime combat ship construction
program in U.S. history as a result of the Reagan
Administration's defense buildup [Ref. l:p. 2]. This boom in
naval construction provided extensive work to shipyards that
would otherwise have found themselves in the throes of the
worldwide shipbuilding depression of the 1980s. Figure 9
below depicts the number of new naval vessels placed on order
with U.S. private shipyards from 1968 to 1990. Figure 10, on
3 The Gephardt-Levin bill, introduced into the House on 4
November 1991, attempts to extend the Super 301 provision which
expired [Ref. 46:p. 2F]
.
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the other hand, illustrates the total Navy orderbook by
showing the total number of new naval vessels under
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Figure 9. New Naval Vessels Ordered From U.S. Shipyards
(1968 - 1990). [Ref. 15:p. 5]
The pace of new naval construction in the 1990s,
however, will not approach the growth experienced during the
last decade. During the Cold War, the Reagan Administration
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was supporting the development of a 600 ship Navy. More
recently, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
Number of Ships
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January 1, Each Year
Figure 10. Total Naval Vessels Under Construction or On
Order at U.S. Shipyards (1969 - 1991). [Ref. 15:p. 5]
of Staff, testified before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense on 24 September 1991 that the Office
of the Secretary of Defense has set the Navy's active ship
goal at 414 ships by 1997 [Ref. 47:p. 3]. This is a reduction
of an additional 34 ships from the number set forth in the
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Department of Defense's FY 1992 budget request. The FY 1992
budget request had indicated a decline from 545 to 450 by 1995
[Ref. 48:p. 28]. With this expressed policy, it is apparent
that the end of the Cold War rivalry and the mounting deficit
problems of the United States Government are dictating a
reappraisal of national defense strategy.
In line with this new reality is the Navy's proposed
shipbuilding budget for FY 92 through FY 97. This budget
calls for the construction of 68 ships or approximately ten
ships per year. The FY 92 - 97 annual construction average is
roughly fifty percent of the average annual naval construction
experienced during the 1980s. The Navy's shipbuilding plan
for FY 92 through FY 97 is shown in Appendix B.
The decline in naval ship construction and repair work
will have a marked effect on the U.S. shipbuilding industry in
terms of employment and the industrial base. According to the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition, Gerald A. Cann, Navy work accounts for
approximately 97 percent of the active U.S. shipbuilding
base's direct construction labor and 50 percent of the ship
repair labor [Ref. 20:p. 286], This employment support has
been present for the past several years. Adding to the impact
of the declining budget is the fact that approximately 90
percent of the Navy's shipbuilding funds have been under
contracts awarded to only five private yards. Those yards
are: Avondale, Bath Iron works, General Dynamics/Electric
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Boat, Ingalls, and Newport News Shipbuilding [Ref. l:p. 2].
This concentration of naval construction (employment and
dollars) in a few private shipyards means that they will be
hard hit by the decline in Navy orders.
Once employment levels at these shipyards drop, it is
unlikely that the shipyards will be successful in attracting
the workers back, even if industry conditions improve.
Shipyards have found it increasingly difficult to attract and
to retain skilled workers in the shipbuilding industry when
job security is all but nonexistent. If laid-off workers are
able to find stable and/or lucrative employment outside of the
shipbuilding industry, there would be little incentive to
return to building ships when the market for shipbuilding
improves [Ref. ll:p. 59]. The good times would only last
until the next industry-wide downturn. Figure 11 illustrates
the U.S. shipbuilding firm swings from 1982 through 1990,
while Figure 12 shows employment level projections in the
active shipbuilding industry [Ref. lrfigure 22-2]. The figure
shows total employment, employment based on projected new
construction, employment based on contracted new construction,
and employment based on repair and non-ship work.
Exacerbating employment levels in the U.S.
shipbuilding industry is the Navy's Reliability and
Improvement Program for the fleet. This program is greatly
improving the reliability and maintainability of weapons
platforms. New vessels equipped with gas turbine and diesel
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Figure 11. U.S. Shipbuilding Base (1982 - 1990). [Ref. 49:
p. 300]
power plants require less maintenance than the old steam
propulsion plants [Ref. 50:p. 2].
In 1990, 60 percent of the Navy's surface combatants
were steam driven while only 22 percent were gas turbine. By
2009, the percentage of steam and gas turbine plants is











Figure 12. Active Shipbuilding Base Labor Projection on
October 1, 1991. [Ref. l:fig. 22-2]
[Ref. 20:p. 396]. When major failures or overhauls are
required for the gas turbine systems, removal and installation
takes at most four to five days, a considerable improvement
over similar service requirements for steam plants [Ref. 20:
p. 396]. A smaller Navy possessing more reliable ships means
less repair and overhaul work for U.S. shipyards. In February
1991, the Shipbuilders Council of America (SCA) projected that
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shipyard maintenance mandays would drop 33 percent below FY 90
levels by FY 1997 [Ref. 50:p. 2]. By February 1992, the SCA
revised their reduction projection to 1995 [Ref. 51:p. 2].
The 1995 timeframe was also reported in the Marine Log
[Ref. 52:p. 14].
The Navy's Maintenance and Modernization Program is
also impacting U.S. shipyard employment levels in other ways.
As a result of changes in ship overhaul policies, major
overhauls are now more spread out than they once were.
Whereas overhauls used to be scheduled every three to five
years for naval vessels, ships may now go up to twelve years
between overhauls. As a comparison, 9 ships went through
major overhaul in FY 1977 whereas only 13 are planned for
overhaul in FY 1991 [Ref. 20:p. 285]. Although major overhaul
intervals were expanded by increasing the number of smaller
repair availabilities for active naval ships, drydock-phased
maintenance availabilities, drydock-selected restricted
availabilities, phased maintenance availabilities, post-
shakedown availabilities, and selected restricted
availabilities are much smaller in scope than are major
overhauls. Consequently, these availabilities require a
smaller standing work force [Ref. 20:p. 391 and Ref. 53:p. 3].
The decline in the number of active Navy ships will
also impact the industrial base. The supplier base is sure to
shrink as a result of the drop in new ship builds and the
decline in the size of the active fleet. Over the past
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decade, the number of U.S. vendors for key ship components has
dropped. This trend is projected to continue into the future
as illustrated in Figure 13 below.
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Figure 13. U.S. Vendor Base for Key Ship Components. [Ref.
l:fig. 8]
American shipbuilders will find it increasingly more
difficult to find domestic sources of supply as the vendor
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base gets smaller4 . Donald T. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of
Defense, has directed the Navy to study how the nuclear
industrial base can be maintained given the smaller number of
nuclear ships scheduled for construction [Ref. 55:p. 21].
As the domestic industrial base contracts,
procurements from foreign sources will grow. The U.S. Navy
already relies on several foreign countries for a number of
standard Navy systems, as previously illustrated in Table 2.
A shrinking industrial base means the United States will
become less and less able to meet defensive needs
independently.
4 Admiral Bruce Demars, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion,
testified before the House Committee on Armed Services Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee and the Department of
Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel in April 1991 that the
nuclear industrial base is being crippled with the reduction in
nuclear ship construction. Currently there is only one remaining
manufacturer in the business of making nuclear cores, one remaining
for fuel, one remaining for reactor cooling pumps, and two
remaining for fuel rod drive mechanisms. In addition, he is seeing
a rapid exodus of subcontractors from the field [Ref. 54: pp. 3 -
12] .
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IV. PROSPECTS FOR RELIEF
U.S. shipbuilders have numerous opportunities to improve
their competitiveness within the world shipbuilding arena.
Some of these opportunities include: world-wide replacement
tonnage demand, double hull legislation for oil tankers
servicing the U.S., fast sealift needs identified as a result
of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and foreign military sales.
Additional avenues for future growth involve the cooperation
of the U.S. Government in the areas of_ foreign policy,
subsidies, and domestic policy. This chapter will focus on
these opportunities and will also summarize some of the recent
studies that address the condition and the capacity of U.S.
shipyards, primarily in terms of national defense.
A. SHIPBUILDING MARKET DEMAND
Market demand for new ships is perhaps the greatest target
of opportunity for U.S. shipyards breaking out of their
reliance on Navy shipbuilding orders. Projections for ship
orders are encouraging with most of the strength coming from
replacement rather than expansion demand [Ref. 15:p. 25]. The
Korean Shipbuilders Association [Ref. 56:p. 2] and the
Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics both predict
that demand will reach approximately 30 million deadweight
tons per year [Ref. 53 :p. 60]. This demand presents a ready
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opportunity for U.S. shipyards to regain a competitive
position in the commercial shipbuilding market before the drop
in Navy orders hits with full impact. Figure 14 below shows
the type of demand that is being predicted.
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The replacement demand reflects the age and condition of
the world's tonnage [Ref. 15:p. 25]. As ships get older, they
become less efficient and more costly to maintain and operate.














Figure 15. Percent of World Tonnage Over 15 Years Old (End
Of 1990) . [Ref . 15:p. 25]
B. DOUBLE HULL TANKERS
The Oil Pollution Act (OPA 90) was signed into law in
August 1990 [Ref. 58:p. 2]. For U.S. shipbuilders, this
legislation represents a source for domestic, commercial
tanker orders. Sixty percent (68 out of 150) of the tankers
operating under Jones Act trade are greater than twenty years
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old [Ref. 59:p. 1]. To serve U.S. ports, tankers ordered
after June 30, 1990 must have double hulls. Beginning in
1995, existing single hull and older double-hulled tankers
will be phased out according to the schedule shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6. PHASE-OUT SCHEDULE FOR SINGLE






































Single hull ships in all three categories must be phased
out by the year 2010. Older double hull ships have until
2015. Lightering vessels transferring oil more than 60 miles
offshore, ships less than 5,000 GT, and vessels operating in
the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port have until 2015 to comply with
the requirements of OPA [Ref. 42: p. 26].
C. SEALIFT PROGRAM
With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, future
conflicts involving U.S. military personnel will probably be
of the type seen in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Gulf
War saw approximately three billion tons of dry cargo and 5.4
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billion tons of petroleum products moved on over 250 MSC
controlled ships [Ref. 60:p. 52]. The shift away from global
warfare to regional warfare lends itself to a re-examination
of the sealift capability required to successfully prosecute
such a conflict while ensuring that U.S. national defense
needs are met.
The lessons from Desert Shield and Desert Storm provide
yet another opportunity for U.S. shipbuilders. The Gulf War
demonstrated once again the need for sealift in meeting
military commitments around the world. Although adequate
sealift capability was obtained to support the Gulf War
effort, 101 of the 120 chartered ships were of foreign
registry [Ref. 60:p. 53]. The mobilization effort also
identified weaknesses in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and
National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) in terms of material
condition and the availability of spare parts [Ref. 60:p. 53].
To correct some of the sealift shortfalls identified, the
Navy is looking at procuring as many as 25 sealift ships in an
effort to acquire an additional 1.2 million square feet of
lift capability. Congress has already appropriated $1,275
billion for this purpose in FYs 1990 and 1991 [Ref. 61:p. 2].
U.S. shipyards participating in this Sealift Program can
potentially get a jump start into the commercial shipbuilding
market, assuming the sealift ships are close in design to
commercially operated vessels.
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One recent proposal is aimed at meeting this goal by
designing ships useful for both defense and commercial
purposes. The features of the proposed ships include: the
same basic hull design, ship control systems, and propulsion
plants [Ref. 62:p. 39]. The ships' cargo sections, however,
would vary in length and design depending on lift
requirements.
Ships envisioned under this program include: convertible
container carriers (CCC) , combination breakbulk and
containership (COMBO) , a heavy-lift model, and a heavy RO/RO.
The designs would stress the minimal number of defense
features so as not to detract from their commercial
usefulness. A building program could then be initiated to
fulfill defense and commercial needs with economies of scale,
and resulting savings, achievable using series building
[Ref. 62:p. 39].
The ships designed for commercial use could either be sold
or leased to commercial operators. The ships designed solely
for defense could be added to the Military Sealift Command's
Maritime Prepositioning Ships or Fast Sealift Ships, or the
ships could be used to augment the Ready Reserve Force or the
Afloat Prepositioning Force. Ships of mutually useful design,
like the ones envisioned, can foster closer relationships
between shipowners, shipbuilders, and the Department of
Defense. Modern ships capable of meeting DOD and commercial
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requirements make a build and charter program a worthwhile
goal to pursue.
D. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
Foreign military sales (FMS) are another potential avenue
for U.S. shipbuilders to rebound from the decline in Navy
business. In addition to helping the balance of trade with
vessel sales and follow-on repair parts, exports would also
help to sustain America's industrial capability and labor
skills.
Submarine-capable shipyards and their suppliers are
already facing a bleak future which could be improved with
exports. In 1991 the Navy stated that two Seawolf-class, or
SSN 21-class, submarines per year would be required to keep
both Electric Boat and Newport News in business [Ref. 60:
p. 56]. In January 1992, the President decided to terminate
the Seawolf Program after the completion of the first of the
class [Ref. 63:p. 3G] . The future of the two yards is now in
question.
The decline in Navy business has a trickle down effect on
shipyard suppliers. Following cancellation of the Seawolf
program, General Dynamics Electric Boat decided to lay off
1,000 to 2,000 personnel by the end of 1992 [Ref. 64:p. 1].
At the subcontractor level, 250 employees from Westinghouse
Electric Corporation's Marine Division were permanently laid-
off as a result of the Seawolf program's termination. The
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Marine Division held part of a subcontract to build the
Seawolf's propulsion gears [Ref. 63:p. 3G] .
Arguments against exports of submarines usually include
the proliferation of U.S. high technology [Ref. 23 :p. 40] and
the lack of diesel submarine requirements in the U.S. Navy
[Ref. 65:p. 2]. To prevent high technology transfer, exports
could be restricted to diesel submarines. Although the shift
from nuclear to diesel power would require modifications to
exporting shipyards, production of diesel powered submarines
is seen by U.S. shipyards as preferable to going out of
business. An added benefit in this scenario, is the retention
of submarine-building industrial base capabilities as well as
the associated labor skills [Ref. 53:p. 2]. It is reasonable
to assume that diesel submarine labor is more readily diverted
to nuclear work than is reconstituting a disbanded nuclear
submarine work force.
To overcome consistent Navy opposition to submarine
exports [Ref. 60:p. 40], U.S. shipbuilders were successful in
lobbying to get language approved in the House Armed Service
Committee's FY 1992 defense appropriations bill. H.R. 2521
prohibits the Military Services from taking action to:
prohibit, impede, or otherwise interfere with
construction of conventionally powered submarines by
nonpublic owned and operated ship construction and
repair entities in the United States for sale to
nations with which the United States maintains
bilateral or multilateral mutual security agreements,
or nations which currently receive foreign military
sales credits or economic support funds from the
United States [Ref. 65:p. 2).
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E. U.S. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
To assist U.S. shipyards in getting re-established in the
world commercial shipbuilding market, the U.S. government
could take action in several areas (i.e., foreign and domestic
policy) .
1. FOREIGN POLICY
In the foreign arena, the U.S government could take
action: to encourage foreign governments to stop subsidizing
their domestic shipbuilding industries, to require greater use
of foreign aid in the form of U.S. services rather than money,
and to foster joint ventures with foreign^ firms in fields
deemed to have critical commercial shipbuilding technology.
a. FOREIGN SUBSIDIES
The Shipbuilder's Council of America (SCA) has been
fighting for years to get the U.S. Government to pressure
foreign governments to stop subsidizing their domestic
shipbuilding industries. The SCA's position is that the U.S.
Government stopped subsidizing U.S. shipyards in 1982 when
Construction Differential Subsidies were ended [Ref. 34:p. 1] .
To make the world shipbuilding playing field level, the SCA
feels that foreign shipbuilding subsidies should be terminated
as well. Otherwise, foreign builders have a distinct
advantage over U.S. shipyards that can never be overcome. The
U.S. Government can bring pressure to bear using the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the vehicle.
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However, the government lacks the political will to do so.
Perhaps this is due to the fact that shipbuilding has never
been a significant player in the U.S. economy [Ref. 8: p. 4].
b. FOREIGN AID TIED TO DOMESTIC SERVICES
To assist domestic shipyards, the U.S. government
could tie greater amounts of foreign aid to domestic services
rather than providing outright grants of cash. In this vein,
commercial shipping needs of aid-receiving countries could be
provided in the form of U.S. built ships. These ships could
be new or trade-ins from U.S. -flag shipowners who would be
given credit for new construction from U. S ._ shipyards. This
alternative provides business to U.S. shipyards, encourages
modernization of the U.S. -flag fleet, and builds replacement
parts demand for U.S. suppliers, thus strengthening the
balance of trade as well as the supplier base.
C. JOINT VENTURES
In critical technology areas for commercial
merchant shipbuilding, the U.S. Government could provide
financial incentives for domestic firms to form joint ventures
with foreign corporations possessing the critical technology.
Alternatively, the government could ensure that bureaucratic
red tape for forming joint ventures is kept to a minimum. The
thrust here is to get the maritime technology into the hands
of the U.S. shipyards so that they can overcome their extended
absence from the commercial shipbuilding market.
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The advantages of joint ventures can be seen in the
relationship between Avondale Industries, Inc., German
shipbroker, Peter Gast Shipping, and Norway's Interyards.
These three firms formed a company whose purpose is to enable
the three participants to put together and jointly market
highly competitive ship equipment packages. For Avondale, the
joint venture means greater competitive capability in the
commercial shipbuilding market in addition to access to a
strong international supplier base. [Ref. 67:p. 1]
.
Similar advantages can be seen between Westinghouse
Marine Division and New Sulzer Diesel Ltd. wherein
Westinghouse will market and manufacture slow- and medium-
speed diesel powered marine propulsion systems [Ref. 68:p. 4].
This joint venture brings needed commercial shipbuilding
technology to a U.S. manufacturer. In turn, domestic
capability and skilled labor are fostered, enhancing the
industrial base of the nation.
2. DOMESTIC POLICY
Issues for the government to address under domestic
policy to encourage the growth of U.S. shipyards in the
commercial market include: subsidies, research and




In the area of subsidies, the U.S. government could
re-address such issues as: capital investment incentives for
sealift modernization and export financing.
(1) Capital Investment Incentives. Capital
investment incentives initiated by the U.S. government would
be geared towards the modernization of the U.S. flag fleet.
U.S. dry bulk vessels, in particular, are some on the oldest
ships in the U.S. inventory [Ref. 12 :p. 75]. Modernization
would bring commercial business to U.S. shipyards as well as
improve the competitiveness of shipowners in their respective
trades.
The capital investment system envisioned
includes both financial and non-financial incentives.
Financial incentives include construction credits when old
U.S. -flag ships are retired. Non-financial incentives include
modernizing the archaic U.S. shipping laws and manning rules
to allow shipowners to take full advantage of the latest
technology available to them, which facilitates reduced
operating costs [Ref. 60:p. 53],
(2) Export Financing . Export financing could be
used by the U.S. government as a tool to encourage foreign
governments to stop the practice. For argument's sake, given
the condition of the U.S. economy, the U.S. could use its
financial leverage to force government subsidies into a state
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of bankruptcy. Although tantamount to a trade war, the
practice would drive home the point that subsidies always hurt
someone. To stop the hurt, stop the subsidies. This
alternative is unlikely given the present financial weakness
of the U.S. Government and the small impact U.S. shipbuilding
has on the nation's economy.
b. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D)
The U.S. shipbuilding industry has been noted for
its lack of coordination within the industry [Ref. 12 :p. Ill]
and its inability to share information among its members
[Ref. 2:p. 17]. A concerted and coordinated research and
development effort can assist in overcoming these problems
through government involvement. U.S. shipbuilders have
concentrated on naval technology over the past decade rather
than commercial shipbuilding designs. Government incentives
could be established which encourage commercial shipbuilding
R&D as well as improve the flow of information within the
industry. Under a centralized R&D program, U.S. shipbuilders
would be encouraged to focus their attention on the commercial
field and would be acclimated to sharing industry information.
Currently the government is only providing R&D
assistance to the National Shipbuilding Research Program
(NSRP) . From 1987 through 1990, this assistance totalled only
$4.6 million [Ref. 36:p. 2]. In comparison, for 1987 and 1988
alone, Japan, Germany, and South Korea provided a combined R&D
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funding total in excess of $78.8 million [Ref. 30:p. 1] . It
is unlikely that U.S. shipyards will gain a strong competitive
advantage in commercial shipbuilding without additional U.S.
Government assistance in the area of R&D.
C. RATIONALIZING U.S. SHIPYARDS
To promote a strong shipyard industry, the U.S.
Government could take steps which would rationalize U.S.
shipbuilding capability. Like Japan, rationalizing shipyards
could require the closure of weaker companies. The remaining
yards would then have the workload to keep them healthy.
Closing private shipyards would be difficult for the U.S.
Government unless the weaker yards were enticed out of the
business. Even" if the industry was nationalized, the pork
barrel politics so well known in government would most likely
produce inefficient results.
F. FORMAL STUDIES
Several formal studies have been made concerning the
condition of U.S. shipyards and their ability to meet national
defense needs. These studies include: the Shipyard
Mobilization Base (SYMBA) Study, the National Defense Shipyard
Study (NADES) , the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and
Atmosphere (NACOA) , the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) , and
the Navy's Strategic Sealift Implementation Plan. One of the
newest formal studies is the Infrastructure Study in
Shipbuilding (ISIS) . ISIS' focus is on commercial
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shipbuilding processes in the United States rather than on
defense needs. A brief summary of each of these studies is
presented below:
1. Shipyard Mobilization Base (SYMBA) Study
The purpose of the SYMBA study was to determine
whether or not the U.S. shipbuilding base in existence in
October 1982 was adequate for meeting major mobilization
requirements in a three-year global war scenario.
Specifically, the conflict envisioned was a "global, non-
nuclear, three-theater, 3-year conflict" [Ref. 14:p. 42]. The
study, completed in 1984, was conducted- jointly by the
Department of Defense and the Maritime Administration,
concluded:
• Minimum first year facilities requirements include 51
building positions, 41 graving docks, and 56 floating
drydocks.
• October 1982 shipyard capacity was more than adequate.
• Shortages in skilled manpower were expected during the
early mobilization and the wartime ship construction
phases. [Ref. 14:p. ix] .
2. National Defense Shipyard (NADES) Study
The NADES study was conducted after 16 of the 110
private shipyards in the SYMBA study had closed prior to
SYMBA's completion in 1984 [Ref. ll:p. 55]. Between October
1982 and June 1985, 20 of the SYMBA shipyards had closed
either temporarily or permanently [Ref. 14:p. 43]. The NADES
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study, like SYMBA, was a joint DOD - MARAD project completed
in 1984.
NADES, however, used different criteria than the SYMBA
study for determining the adequacy of the U.S. shipbuilding
base in meeting major mobilization requirements.
Specifically, NADES only reassessed the first eight months of
mobilization and it focused on just 66 shipyards (9 public and
56 private) [Ref. 14 :p. 43]. Assumptions about early
mobilization and greater sealift requirements were also
differences between the two studies [Ref. 14:p. ix] . Among
other things, NADES concluded the followingj
• Early mobilization requirements necessitated the
availability of 142,000 skilled workers.
• Skilled workforce requirements would peak in the eighth
month of the conflict at 157,000.
• Peacetime employment, including projected 1990 workforce
levels, were adequate. [Ref. 14 :p. ix]
.
3. National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere
(NACOA)
The NACOA study of 1985 followed both SYMBA and NADES.
The NACOA study had three objectives. First, determine the
most effective and efficient method for achieving adequate
wartime sealift capability. Second, determine the shipyard
base required to support mobilization, construction, and
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repair requirements. Third, determine levels and types of
Federal support necessary to achieve the other two objectives
[Ref. 14:p. vii] . The NACOA concluded that a strong U.S. -flag
fleet is more important for achieving wartime sealift
capability than is a strong U.S. shipbuilding industry. A
strong U.S. -flag fleet will provide the necessary sealift
capacity at the start of a conflict as well as the trained
crews essential for maritime endeavors. Some of the NACOA' s
recommendations to this end included:
• researching and stressing military useful features on
U.S. -flag vessels.
• allowing U.S. operators to buy ships built in foreign
shipyards (including provisions for Jones Act trade).
• providing incentives for foreign flag vessels to become
U.S. -flagged [Ref. 14:pp. 72 - 75].
With regard to shipyards, the NACOA study concluded that
peacetime military shipbuilding, conversion, and repair
programs would ensure an adequate mobilization base [Ref. 14:
p. 72].
4. Mobility Requirements Study (MRS)
The DOD has determined strategic sealift requirements
through its Mobility Requirements Study which was completed in
January 1992. Based on the need for sealift under a broad
spectrum of scenarios, the MRS has determined the "size, mix,
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number, and employment of sealift ships" necessary to meet
national requirements [Ref. 69 :p. 2].
Among other things, the MRS calls for twenty large,
medium speed RO/ROs from either reconversions or new
construction. Eleven of these RO/ROs are to be assigned to
Fast Sealift with the other nine prepositioned. Additionally,
the MRS calls for the lease of two container ships which also
will be prepositioned. The delivery schedule projects 6 ships
in FYs 94, 96, and 97, and 4 ships in FY 98. Finally, the MRS
supports the growth of the RRF from its current 9 6 ships to
142 ships [Ref. 70:p. 5],
5. Navy's Strategic Sealift Implementation Plan
The Navy's Strategic Sealift Implementation Plan
documents how the Navy proposes to use the FY 90 and FY 91
sealift appropriations of $1,275 billion and $1.3 billion,
respectively. This plan was submitted to the House
Appropriations Committee per the Committee's request. The
plan used the Navy's Interim Response to the MRS of April 22,
1991, and was later incorporated into the MRS Final Report
[Ref. 69:p. 2].
One of the Strategic Sealift Implementation Plan's
recommendations is the initiation of the concept design for
two types of roll-on/roll-off (ro/ro) ships. To date, nine
contracts have been let by the Navy to U.S. shipyards for the
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development of conceptual designs for the 750-foot and 900-
foot length ships [Ref. 69:p. 2].
6. Infrastructure Study in Shipbuilding: A Systems
Analysis of U.S. Commercial Shipbuilding Practices
The ISIS study of 1991 was performed by a team at the
David Taylor Research Center. The purpose of the study was to
examine the U.S. commercial shipbuilding practices, using a
systems approach. The study's aim was to focus on the
acquisition process, in particular, in order to identify
alternatives that would assist U.S. shipbuilders in becoming
world-class competitors in the commercial shipbuilding market.
Some of the study's more significant conclusions include:
• information sharing within the U.S. shipbuilding industry
is a problem.
• shipbuilders have no domestic source capable of analyzing
the world shipbuilding market and matching market needs to
U.S. shipbuilder capabilities.
• shipbuilders need to be proactive in controlling,
documenting, and monitoring the acquisition process rather
than reacting to their customers.
• shipbuilders need to develop financial acumen in acquiring
private capital to finance new shipbuilding. Financing
should become a part of the package being sold to the
customer.
• shipbuilders need to develop the ability to forecast and
analyze market needs so that ships can be designed and
sold to the customer. The customer defines requirements
under current practice without any forethought on the part
of the shipyard.
• shipbuilders need to develop industry design and material
standards to improve material procurement and production
leadtimes. [Ref. 2:pp. 17 - 18]
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The ISIS study concludes that the U.S. is in danger of
losing its commercial shipbuilding capability to foreign
shipbuilders. Although the study encourages action to rebuild
the U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry, it does not make
any recommendations directed towards that aim.
The avenues above provide potential sources of new
business for American shipyards. Like all commercial
entities, U.S. shipyards must maintain a customer base that is
willing to buy shipbuilding and ship repair services at a
price that covers their cost of production and a reasonable
profit. Furthermore, shipyards must be able to provide the
product in a" timeframe which meets the customer's
requirements. The alternatives to these precepts are for
American shipyards to concentrate on repair work only, change
industries, or to go out of business entirely. The next




V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Chapter II provided an overview of shipbuilding. Topics
addressed included the growth of the U.S. shipbuilding
industry, the complexity of the shipbuilding process, the
capital and labor reguirements that make the shipbuilding
industry unigue, and the national defense issues associated
with shipbuilding capability. Chapter II further described
the uncompetitiveness of U.S. shipyards, jtheir shift from
commercial to Navy work, the growth of repair and specialty
work over construction, and the competition between private
and public shipyards for repair and modernization work.
Chapter III covered the principal reasons for the decline
of U.S. shipyards. Overcapacity, the cyclic nature of the
industry, foreign competition, and U.S. influences were
discussed in detail.
Finally, Chapter IV described some avenues that U.S.
shipyards can pursue to strengthen their position in the
international commercial merchant shipbuilding market. Areas
of potential growth include the projected worldwide demand for
vessel tonnage, double hull tankers, the Navy's Sealift
Program, foreign military sales, and active U.S. Government
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involvement. What follows are the conclusions and
recommendations drawn from the data presented in this thesis.
B. CONCLUSIONS
With possibly three exceptions (the Clipper Era, and the
First and Second World Wars), the U.S. shipbuilding industry
has never been a dominant supplier of the world's commercial
vessels. Typically the percentage of world merchant orders
filled by U.S. yards averages in the single digits.
Following the Second World War, the volume of military
cargo ships sold to civilian entities glutted the market and
required additional adjustments in the industry as it moved
from a wartime to a peacetime posture. The Korean and Vietnam
Wars did little to spur new construction in the United States.
The war buildups were taken care of by existing assets in the
NDRF, RRF, or commercial market and did not require a
tremendous addition to the U.S. sealift capacity to prosecute
the wars.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. shipbuilders allowed
the Japanese to master the shipbuilding processes (i.e.,
modular production, financing, and shorter construction times)
which would make them the undisputed world leaders in
commercial shipbuilding. The Japanese successfully developed
their market and have been reaping the benefits ever since
(i.e., learning new processes, keeping workforce skill levels
high, maintaining their industrial base and second tier
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suppliers, and earning profits to maintain and modernize
facilities) .
In the early 1980s the Executive Branch of the U.S.
Government terminated Construction Differential Subsidies. As
U.S. labor costs were significantly higher than the foreign
competition, particularly Korea and Japan, and as foreign
governments did not withdraw similar subsidies from their own
shipbuilding industries at the same time, the elimination of
CDS further eroded the competitiveness of U.S. yards in the
world commercial shipbuilding market. The number of
commercial merchant vessels built in the U.S. has since
declined consistently, finally hitting zero in 1988 through
1990.
Despite this persistent drop in commercial builds in the
1980s, U.S. shipyards benefitted from the largest peacetime
naval build-up in U.S. history. Navy contracts made up for
the loss of commercial orders and ultimately accounted for
approximately 95 percent of the ship repair, modernization,
and construction work at the biggest five shipyards in the
United States.
This naval buildup has peaked and the pendulum is now
reversing its swing. U.S. shipyards are currently facing an
environment where they have been out of the commercial market
for years. At the same time, their primary customer for the
past decade is significantly reducing the amount of work
previously supplied. Areas of work reduction cut across the
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spectrum, and they include new construction, modernization,
and maintenance of the active fleet.
Exacerbating the predicament of U.S. shipyards are the
technological and philosophical changes which the Navy
implemented over the course of the buildup. A change from
steam to gas turbine and diesel power plants has greatly
reduced the number of maintenance man-days required to keep
these systems operational. The Reliability Improvement
Program has also lowered the number of maintenance man-hours
in other areas as failure rates have declined. Consequently,
shipyards are getting less work per Navy ship than they did in
the 1980s and earlier.
Given the projected loss of work at the big five shipyards
and the absence of new commercial orders to replace that work,
U.S. shipbuilding capacity will exceed demand once again. As
in the past, those shipyards unable to attract a profitable
level of business will cease to exist. This will probably be
the case for the General Dynamics Electric Boat Division,
given the cancellation of the Seawolf program and the prospect
that there will not be enough submarine business in the
foreseeable future to support both Electric Boat and Newport
News. Another of the big five may also leave the ship
construction business as the level of Navy work reduces to a
point below the minimum support level required to keep the
yards profitably employed.
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The further loss of U.S. shipbuilding capability will
negatively impact the industrial base. As yards close,
skilled labor will find work elsewhere and suppliers will
leave the business, reducing sources of supply for the
remaining shipyards.
Despite the projected loss of Navy business, U.S.
shipyards have several opportunities which can alleviate the
impact of declining Navy work. First, predictions for
worldwide replacement tonnage are optimistic. Second, the new
double hull tanker requirements will generate Jones Act
business. Third, Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated
once again the importance of sealift and provided the impetus
to get the sealift "ball" rolling. Fourth, closer trade ties
under GATT will slowly weaken the subsidy advantage of
European shipyards as will continued subsidy reductions called
for by the EC's Seventh Directive. Finally, potential foreign
military sales offer another avenue for relief.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
Since one of the government's primary responsibilities is
national defense, the government should determine the shipyard
capability required to meet national security needs and
examine how to best maintain that level. Such a study would
be similar to the SYMBA and NADES studies. Reducing,
maintaining, or increasing existing shipbuilding capability
will depend on the results of such a study.
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Reductions in capability would not necessarily be a goal.
If commercial work could support a shipbuilding capability in
excess of defensive needs, this would be the preferred
alternative, providing government financing would not be
required.
Maintaining or increasing existing capability would be a
much harder task. Given the present state of the federal
budget and the lack of commercial orders in U.S. yards, it
would be extremely difficult to attract the thirty merchant
builds per year to maintain the current shipyard base. It
would be even more difficult to expand present shipbuilding
capability without a tremendous amount of federal support.
As has been the case over the centuries, wild oscillations
in shipbuilding capacity are expected to continue in the
future. It is the industry's nature to expand and contract to
meet the trade and the military requirements of the world's
nations. The strongest shipyards will survive the future
downturns. The weak ones may not. Shipbuilding is not a
business for the weak at heart.
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APPENDIX A.
SHIPS CONSTRUCTED IN THE UNITED STATES (19 4 9 - 19 58)




1949 33 540 857
1950 24 381 615
1951 10 147 182
1952 16 239 300
1953 37 493 752
1954 36 548 868
1955 7 94 131
1956 7 98 159
1957 11 236 373
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